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1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
Lis£-(CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE .....
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, _nstructions
for Preparation of FMEA and CIL, i00Gtobe_ _986.
The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Elevon Subsystem
hardware, generating draft failure modes, and potential critical
items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished
without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA
FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to
the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline with proposed Post 51-L updates included.
A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided
through additional analysis as required. This report documents the
results of that comparison for the Orbiter Elevon hardware.
The IOA product for the Elevon analysis consisted of twenty-five
failure mode_"worksheets" that resuited in seventee=n potential
critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the NASA
FMEA/CIL, (as of 7 December 87) which consisted of (Note i)
twenty-three FMEAs and thirteen CIL items. The comparison
determine d if there were any results which hadbeen found by the
IOA but were not in the NASA baseline. This comparison produced
agreement on all CIL items. Based on the Pre 51-L baseline, all
non-CIL FMEAs were also in agreement. Based on discussions with
the NASA subsystem manager, no additional non-CIL FMEAs are
anticipated for the post 51-L update. Figure 1 presents a
comparison of the proposed Post 51-L NASA baseline, with the IOA
recommended baseline, and any issues.
Note I. The comparison and correlation of NASA FMEA Non-CIL
items is based on the Pre 51-L baseline since all post 51-L FMEAs
have not been received as the date of this report.
The initial issues which were resolved arose due to NASA combining
failures which had the same effect in one FMEA whereas IOA wrote a
separate analysis for each failure. Minor issues such as fail or
pass of screens did not effect the number of CIL items agreed to.
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Figure 1 - ELEVON ACTUATOR ASSESSMENT SUMMARY
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose 7
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS
Office has undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for
the Space Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent
assessment of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL reevaluation results for
completeness and technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL
reevaluation results. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEAs/CILs that is
performed and documented at a later date.
Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
I.i Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
r_
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Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 Ground Rules and Assumptions
The ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are defined in
Appendix B.
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3.0 SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The following sections describe the elevon actuator system hardware.
Each of the four elevon actuator systems (Figure 2) comprise the
following components: a flow cutoff valve, switching valve, EH
servoactuator, secondary pressure transducer, bypass valve, power
valve, primary actuator, primary actuator delta pressure transducer,
and primary actuator position transducer.
3.1 Design and Function
The elevon actuators are located at the trailing edge of the wing
surface. The proper function of the elevons is essential during the
dynamic flight phases of ascent and entry. During flight the
Orbiter is controlled, in part, by four aerosurfaces called elevons.
An elevon is a control surfact which performs the same functions as
an elevator and an aileron on a conventional airplane. In the
ascent phase of flight, the elevons are used for relieving high wing
loads. For entry, the eievons are used to pitch and roll the
vehicle.
Each elevon actuator is driven by one primary actuator. Control of
the actuator is provided by four EH servovalves. These servovalves
are used to create a secondary delta pressure which controls the
flow of hydraulic fluid to one power valve. This power valve, when
actuated, diverts fluid to the primary actuator (Figure 3).
The flow cutoff valve (or low-pressure bypass valve) is used to
circulate hydraulic fluid during certain thermally cold periods.
The flow cutoff valve should be opened during circulation pump
operations only. The flow cutoff valve must be closed during high-
pressure operations or degraded elevon performance will result.
The switching valve diverts pressure from one of the Orbiter's three
hydraulic systems to supply adequate fluid and pressure to the
primary and secondary elevon hydraulic system. The switching valve
(Figure 4) contains two pistons, a primary and a secondary. If the
pressure in the primary Orbiter hydraulic sytem drops below 1200 to
1500 psi, the switching valve primary piston will translate and
allow the secondary hydraulic system to provide the required fluid
and pressure to the downstream actuators. If the second hydraulic
system is unable to provide pressure above 1200 to 1500 psi, the
second switching valve piston will translate allowing the third
hydraulic system to provide pressure to the actuator and
servovalves. Linear Variable Differential Transformers (LVDTs)
attached to the switching valve pistons indicate to the crew which
hydraulic system is powering the elev0n.
L_
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The many small passages, orifices, and restrictions in the secondary
side of the servovalve assembly are highly sensitive to
contaminants which enter the hydraulic sytem. A 15 micron filter
conditions the hydraulic fluid which supplies the secondary side
of the actuation system.
The elevon bypass valve is used to isolate an erroneous servovalve
output from influencing the power valve movement. If secondary
delta pressure exceeds 2200 psi for 120 milliseconds, the bypass
valve diverts fluid away from the power spool to the return,
preventing the erroneous or failed channel from creating a potential
force-flight or incorrectly influencing power spool and elevon
motion.
The secondary delta pressure transducers are used to measure the
instantaneous pressure differential between the hydraulic source
(nominally 3000 psi) and the servovalve reduced pressure. The
transducer comprises a dual-spring balanced piston and a LVDT
which transmits a transducer piston position in the form of a
voltage to the Aerosurface Servo Amplifier (ASA). The ASA can
use this voltage to determine the delta pressure across the
corresponding servovalve. This information is used to bias
equalization of four servovalve channels and activate their
corresponding bypass valves when a channel cutoff is required.
The power valve combines four servovalve induced secondary delta
pressures into a translation representing the commanded elevon
movemen_t. As the power valve moves, it allows a primary pressure to
translate the primary actuator and its c0rresponding elevon. When
one of the four secondary pressures are bypassed or erroneous, the
remaining three pressures will overdrive the power valve.
The primary actuator is responsible for the ultimate motion of the
elevon. It is controlled by a secondary pressure power valve which
diverts primary hydraulic fluid and pressure to the actuator
(Figure 5).
The primary delta pressure transducer is used to measure the
instantaneous pressure differential across the primary actuator.
The transducer comprises a dual-spring balanced piston and a LVDT
which transmits a transducer piston position in the form of a
voltage to the ASA. The ASA uses this voltage to determine the
delta pressure across the primary actuator.
The position feedback transducer feeds the instantaneous position of
the elevon to the ASA and General Purpose Computers (GPCs). The
transducer consists of a LVDT calibrated to feedback a position
voltage to the ASA. This information is used by the ASA for
servovalve biasing and to the GPCs for Flight Control System (FCS)
and caution and warning inputs. The current elevon position is
displayed to the crew on the surface position indicators on Panel
F7.
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3.2 Interfaces and Locations
The elevon system hardware is located at the trailing edge of the
Orbiter's wings. The elevon system interfaces with the Orbiter's
three hydraulic systems, each corresponding to one Auxiliary Power
Unit (APU). The elevon system hardware interfaces with the ASAs
which in turn interface with the FCS portion of the GPCs for system
control, fault detection, actuation and feedback.
3.3 Hierarchy
Figure 2 illustrates the hierarchy of the Elevon hardware and
the corresp6nding subcomponents. Figures 3 through 5 comprise
the detailed system representations.
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Figure 2 - ELEVON SUBSYSTEM OVERVIEW
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Figure 4 - SWITCHING VALVE
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4.0 ASSESSMENT RESULTS
The IOA analysis of the elevon actuator hardware initially generated
twenty-five failure modes worksheets and identified seventeen
Potential Critical Items (PCIs) before starting the assessment
process. No additional failure mode worksheets were generated
during the comparison. The analysis results were compared to the
proposed NASA Post 51-L baseline of (Note i) twenty-three FMEAs
and thirteen CIL items. Upon completion of the assessment all of
the IOA and NASA failure modes were in agreement.
Note I. Only Post 51-L NASA CIL items have been received; all
Post 51-L NASA FMEAs were not received as of this report date.
Non-CIL items comparison was based on review of NASA Pre 51-L
baseline and the IOA analysis.
Appendix C presents the detailed assessment worksheets for each
failure mode identified and assessed. Appendix D highlights the
NASA critical items and corresponding IOA worksheet ID. Appendix
E contains IOA analysis worksheets supplementing previous
analysis results reported in STS Engineering and Operations
Support (STSEOS) Working Paper 1.0-SP-VA86001-25, Analysis of the
ELevon, 3 December 1986. No supplemental analysis worksheets
were generated for the Elevon assessment. Appendix F provides a
cross-reference between the NASA FMEA and corresponding IOA
worksheets. IOA recommendations are also summarized.
A summary of the quantity of NASA FMEAs assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified is presented in
Table I.
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TABLE I Summary of IOA FMEA Assessment
Component NASA IOA Issues
o Primary Actuator
o Check Valve
o Primary Delta P X-DCER
o Primary Feedback X-DCER
o Switch Valve Assembly
o Switch Valve
o Flow Control Valve
o Filter
o Servovalve Assembly
o E-H Servovalve
o Bypass Valve
o Sec. Delta P X-DCER
o Power Valve
6
2
2
1
2
2
1
3
2
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
TOTAL 23 23 0
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A summary of the quantity of NASA CIL items assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline , and any issues identified is presented
in Table II.
TABLE II Summary of IOA CIL Assessment
Component NASA IOA ISSUES
w
m
w
w
o Primary Actuator
o Check Valve
o Primary Delta P X-DCER
o Primary Feedback X-DCER
o Switch Valve Assembly
o Switch Valve
o Flow Control Valve
o Filter
o Servovalve Assembly
o E-H Servovalve
o Bypass Valve
o Sec. Delta P X-DCER
o Power Valve
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
TOTAL 13 13 0
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Table III presents a summary of the IOA recommended failure
criticalities for the Post 51-L FMEA baseline. Further
discussion of each of these subdivisions and the applicable
failure modes is provided in subsequent paragraphs.
w
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TABLE III Summary of IOA Recommended Failure Criticalities
Criticality: 2/2 3/IR
o Primary Actuator
o Check Valve
o Primary Delta
P X-DCER
o Primary Feed-
back X-DCER
o Switch Vlv Assy
o Switch Valve
o Flow Cntrl Vlv
o Filter
o Servovalve Assy
o E-H Servovalve
o Bypass Valve
o Sec. Delta P
X-DCER
o Power Valve
TOTAL
I/i
2
1
1
1
1
1
7
2/IR
1
1
2
1
5
2
2
4
3/2R
1
1
3/3
3
2
6
TOTAL
6
2
2
1
2
2
1
3
2
1
1
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Of the failure modes analyzed, 17 failures were determined to
be critical items. A summary of the IOA recommended critical
items is presented in Table IV.
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TABLE IV Summary of IOA Recommended Failure Criticalities
Criticality: 2/IR 2/2 3/IR 3/3
o Primary Actuator
o Check Valve
o Primary Delta
P X-DCER
o Primary Feed-
back X-DCER
o Switch Vlv Assy
o Switch Valve
o Flow Cntrl Vlv
o Filter
o Servovalve Assy
o E-H Servovalve
o Bypass Valve
o Sec. Delta P
X-DCER
o Power Valve
1/i
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
3/2R
1
TOTAL
3
2
1
2
1
2
1
11
TOTAL 7 5 1 13
w
The scheme of assigning IOA assessment (Appendix C) and analysis
(Appendix E) worksheet numbers is shown in Table V.
w
TABLE V IOA Worksheet Number
Component IOA ID Number
Primary actuator
Switch Valve Assembly
Servovalve Assembly
Elevon-106, 107, 117, 118, 119,
120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125
Elevon-101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 108
Elevon-109, ii0, iii, 112, 113,
114, 115, 116
w
15
w
4.1 Primary Actuator
Failures which were related to the Elevon actuator as an entity
were analyzed. Critical failures were the loss of hydraulic fluid
due to gross and slow leaks. There failures were caused by
component rupture, manifold leaks, cylinder and actuator body
fractures and seal leaks, o£her critical failures were associated
with mechanical failures of the ram/piston assembly. The loss of
the four primary feedback transducers due to mechanical failure of
the gauged linkage also resulted in a critical failure.
4.2 Switch Valve Assembly
Components of the assembly were individually analyzed. The most
critical failures were associated with contaminated hydraulic
fluid which restricted fluid flow, clogged filters and jammed
valves which resulted in failure to switch hydraulic sources and
to prevent fluid flow through a check valve to the main drive
piston.
4.3 Servovalve Assembly
The worst critical failures were caused by I) hydraulic fluid
contaminated which caused the main power alve to jam open or
closed, and 2) rupture of the power valve housing due to fatigue
which caused loss of all hydraulic fluid with associated loss of
actuator control. Loss of command signal input, jammed valve and
fractured flapper valve caused loss of a servovalve; however the
three remaining servovalves overdrive the failed servovalve
providing nominal control.
4.4 Failure Comparison
The reason for the IOA showing more CIL items than NASA was due to
the fact that IOA wrote failure sheets for each item whereas NASA
combined failures. Review of the NASA CIL items showed that all
of IOA failures had been analyzed. Since the combined failures
all resulted in the same effect it was concluded that there were
no issues with the IOA failures. Minor differences such as pass
or fail of screens were readily resolved. Frequent discussions
with the subsystem manager resulted in a better understanding of
the system and component operation. As a result of these
discussions, several IOA criticalities were downgraded.
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5.0 REFERENCES
Reference documentation available from NASA and Rockwell was used
in the analysis• The documentation used included the following:
1. NSTS 22206:
• FCS/EFF 2102:
3. JSCll174:
4. VS70-580996:
5. STS82-0039A:
6. NASA CP-2342:
• SD72-SH-0102-9:
8. SD72-SH-0102-6:
Instructions for Preparation of
FMEA and CIL October i0, 1986
The FCS/Effectors Trainig Manual
February 1982
MOD Drawings - applicable pages
Rockwell Drawings
Applicable CIL Sections
Space Shuttle Technical Conference
Part 2, pp. 861-871, June 28-30, 1983
Requirements/Definition Document
Aero Flight Control Mechanisms
Rockwell International, Volume 2-9,
October 28, 1975
Requirements/Definition Document
Hydraulic Subsystem
Rockwell International, SDM Baseline,
January 3, 1977
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APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS
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APU
ASA
ASSY
CIL
EH
FCS
FM
FMEA
F
GFE
GPC
HW
IOA
LVDT
MDAC
NA
NASA
NSTS
PCI
psi
psid
RI
VLV
xducer
- Auxiliary Power Unit
- Aerosurface Servo Amplifier
- Assembly
- Critical Items List
- Electro-Hydraulic
- Flight Control System
- Failure Mode
- Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
- Functional
- Government Furnished Equipment
- General Purpose Computer
- Hardware
- Independent Orbiter Assessment
- Linear Variable Differential Transformer
- McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
- Not Applicable
- National Aeronautics and Space Adminstration
- National Space Transportation System
- Potential Critical Item
- Pounds Per Square Inch
- Pounds Per Square Inch Differential
- Rockwell International
- Valve
- Transducer
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation
o_ FMEA/C_L, i0 October 1986, were used with the following
amplifications and additions.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENC_ CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
planned end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
_GHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(ops)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
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MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
_RIMARy MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE ' begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
" - ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
D_ORBIT pHAS_ - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDI_G/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ends With the completion of pos£'landing
safing operations
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, _nstructions for
Preparation of FMEA/CIL, I0 October 1986, was employed with the
following amplifications and additions•
I.
•
•
•
.
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
£his task. -......
After liftoff, any parameter which is m0nitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
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All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail•
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest•
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed•
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
l
D
B.3 Elevon-Specifio Ground Rules and Assumptions
The IOA analysis was performed to the component or assembly level
of the Elevon subsystem. The analysis considered the worst case
effects of the hardware or functional failure on the subsystem,
mission, and crew and vehicle safety.
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APPENDIX C
DETAILED ASSESSMENT
This section contains the IOA assessment worksheets generated
during the Assessment of the Elevon Actuator Subsystem. The
information on these worksheets facilitates the comparison of the
NASA FMEA/CIL (Pre and Post 51-L) to the IOA detailed analysis
worksheets included in Appendix E. Each of these worksheets
identifies the NASA FMEA being assessed, corresponding MDAC
Analysis Worksheet ID (Appendix E), hardware item, criticality,
redundancy screens, and recommendations. For each failure mode,
the highest assessed hardware and functional criticality is
compared and discrepancies noted as "N" in the compare row under
the column where the discrepancy occurred.
LEGEND FOR IOA ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS
w
Hardware Criticalities:
1 - Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
1R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission
Redundancy Screens A, B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F - Failed Screen
NA - Not Applicable
NASA Data :
Baseline
New
NASA FMEA/CIL
Baseline with Proposed Post 51-L Changes
CIL Item :
X - Included in CIL
Compare Row :
N = Non compare for that column (deviation)
C-I
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
D
D
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: ELEVON-I01
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-C01-CII
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ELEVON
I01
FLOW CUTOFF VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
mm
mm
mm
ms
m
I
mR
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS. NO ISSUE.
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: ELEVON-102
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-C01-C12
NASA DATA:
_BASELINE [ X ] ......
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ELEVON
102
FLOW CUTOFF VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY_sCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS. NO ISSUE.
i
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: ELEVON-103
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-C01-SW-C06
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ELEVON
MDAC ID: 103
ITEM: SWITCHING VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS. THIS IOA FMEA WAS WRITTEN
SPECIFICALLY FOR THE SWITCHING VALVE. NOTE: IOA FMEA NO. 125
COVERS THE SAME NASA FMEA BUT FOR THE SERVO ACTUATOR. NO ISSUE.
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L
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: ELEVON-104
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-C01-SW-C02
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ELEVON
MDAC ID: 104
ITEM: SWITCHING VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ]
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS. NO ISSUE.
[x]
[ ]
=
=
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: ELEVON-105
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-C01-A01
SUBSYSTEM: ELEVON
MDAC ID: 105
ITEM: SWITCHING VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
ix]
[ ]
g
l
mm
i
J
mm
l
u
REC0_NDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS. THIS I0A FMEA WAS WRITTEN FOR
COMPONENT RUPTURES DOWNSTREAM OF THE SWITCHING VALVE. NOTE IOA
FMEA NO. 115 COVERS THE SAME NASA FMEA BUT FOR THE POWER VALVE.
NO ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: ELEVON-106
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-C01-CV-C08
SUBSYSTEM: ELEVON
MDAC ID: 106
ITEM: CHECK VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[X],
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If differen£ from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS. NO ISSUE.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ix]
[ ]
w
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: ELEVON-107
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-C01-CV-C09
SUBSYSTEM: ELEVON
MDAC ID: 107
ITEM: CHECK VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
N_A [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [N] [ ] [ ] [ ]
I
mm
B
i
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g
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /. ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS. WOULD REQUIRE TWO FAILURES TO RESULT
IN A LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE. NO ISSUE.
mm
M
m
D
mm
u
i
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-8
i
g
wu
=
u
W
= =
Imm
i
w
L
E
m
m
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: ELEVON-108
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-C01-FE-B08
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ELEVON
108
FILTER - 15 MICRON
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ X ] *
ix]
COMP_ [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS". (If different from NASA)
• [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS. NO ISSUE.
[x]
[ ]
w
w
w
w
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: ELEVON-109
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-C01-SV-B01
SUBSYSTEM: ELEVON
MDAC ID: 109
ITEM: SERVO VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[p]
[p]
[ ]
B
IF]
[P]
IN]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[p]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
r
m
b
im
m
u
I
g
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS. NO ISSUE.
[x]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: ELEVON-II0
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-C01-A03
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ELEVON
MDAC ID: ii0
ITEM: SERVO VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ ]
°
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS" (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS. THIS IOA FMEA COVERS THE ELEVON SERVO
VALVE. IOA FMEA NO. 120 CoVERs THE SAME FAILURE MOpE (INTERNAL
LEAKAGE) BUT FOR THE PRIMARY ACTUATOR. IOA ANALYSIS BROKE THE
ELEVON HARDWARE TO A LOWER LEVEL THAN THE NASA ANALYSIS.
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENTID: ELEVON-III
NASA FMEA #: .... O2-6-C01-SV-B02
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
N_W [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ELEVON
iii
SERVO VALVE RESTRICTOR
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Enm
I
mm
i
I
m
D
n
l
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
SERVO VALVE RESTRICTOR PLUGS AND CAUSES AN IMBALANCE IN THE SERVO
VALVE; _ T_E---RE_4AI_!NG SERVO/VAL_S oPEP_TE°T_P()WER SPOOL.
CONCUR WITH NASA.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
m
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: ELEVON-II2
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-C01-B03
_ _UBSYSTEM: ELEVON
-- _ MDAC ID: 112
ITEM: BYPASS VALVE
-- LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
z :
w
_Z
i
w
w
=
w
u
E
u
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
_i_ HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
:- IOA [ 2 /IR ]
i!i
COMPARE [ N / ]
....RECOMMENDATIONS"
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
(If different from NASA)
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
ix]
[ ]
_; [. / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
_* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE; (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
..... INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
I--CONCUR WITH NASA _LYSIS. NOISSUE. TAKES 3 FAILURES; SERVO-
_-VALVETHEN _ BYPASS VALVEA/_D ANOTHER SERVO-VALVE.
r=
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u
D
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: ELEVON-II3
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-C01-B03
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ELEVON
113
BYPASS VALVE FILTER-100 MICRON
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A PLUGGED FILTER WOULD PREVENT THE BYPASS VALVE FROM BYPASSING AN
ERRONEOUS CHANNEL. THE REMAINING T_CHANNELS WOULD OVERDRIVE
THE BAD CHANNEL. THIS ASSESSMENT IS COVERED BY NASA FMEA/CIL 02-
6-C01-B03 (INCLUDES OTHER FAILURES MODES). SAME EFFECT
AS MDAC ID 112. NO ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: ELEVON-II4
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-C01-PP-A06
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ELEVON
114
SECONDARY DELTA PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
.... CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
IX]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS. NO ISSUE.
ix]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: ELEVON-II5
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-C01-A01
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ELEVON
MDAC ID: 115
ITEM: POWER VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS. THIS IOA _AWAS WRITTEN FOR THE
RUPTURE OF THE POWER VALVE. NOTE - IOA FMEA NO. i05 COVERS THE
SAME NASA FMEA FOR OTHER COMPONENTS DOWNSTREAM OF THE SWITCHING
VALVE. NO ISSUE. AGREE TO INCORPORATE UNDER ONE FMEA.
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i
m
m
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: ELEVON-II6
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-C01-PV-B05
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ELEVON
MDAC ID: 116
ITEM: POWER VALVE
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ I /i ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS. NO ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: ELEVON-II7
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-C01-C06
SUBSYSTEM: ELEVON
MDAC ID: 117
ITEM: PRIMARY ACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[P]
[ NA]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
l
m
W
mR
m
ms
I
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS. NO ISSUE.
PREVENTS RAPID LOSS OF HYDRAULIC FLUID.
ACTUATOR CONTROL.
BUILT IN BARRIER SEAL
CAN STILL MAINTAIN
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: ELEVON-II8
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-C01-PP-A07
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ELEVON
MDAC ID: 118
ITEM: LVDT
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUND_CY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CiL
ITEM
[ X] *
[x]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS. NO ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENTID: ELEVON-II9
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-C01-A02
SUBSYSTEM: ELEVON
MDAC ID: 119
ITEM: PRIMARY ACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 1 /I ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
ix]
[ ]
E
m
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS. NO ISSUE.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: ELEVON-120
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-C01-A03
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ELEVON
MDAC ID: 120
ITEM: PRIMARY ACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS. THIS IOA FMEA COVERS THE ELEVON
PRIMARY ACTUATOR. IOA FMEA NO. ii0 COVERS THE SAME FAILURE MODE
(INTERNAL LEAKAGE) BUT FOR THE SERVO VALVE. IOA ANALYSIS BROKE
THE ELEVON HARDWARE TO A LOWER LEVEL THAN THE NASA ANALYSIS.
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B
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: ELEVON-121
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-C01-A04
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ELEVON
121
PRIMARY DELTA PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
m
m
i
i
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS. REQUIRES TWO OF FOUR TRANSDUCER
OUTPUTS FOR FAULT DETECTION DURING NULL FLIGHT PERIODS. NO
ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: ELEVON-122
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-C01-B07
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM :
MDAC ID:
ITEM :
ELEVON
122
PRIMARY ACTUATOR DELTA PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
LEAD ANALYST : R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS. REQUIRES TWO OF FOUR TRANSDUCER
OUTPUTS FOR FAULT DETECTION DURING NULL FLIGHT PERIODS. NO
ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENT ID: ELEVON-123
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-C01-A08
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ELEVON
MDAC ID: 123
ITEM: HEATER
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ NA] [ NA]
[ NA] [ NA]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ NA]
[ NA]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
B
n
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mm
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS. NO ISSUE.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSME_ DATE: 12/20/8V
ASSESSMENT ID: ELEVON-124
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-C01-A09
SUBSYSTEM: ELEVON
MDAC ID: 124
ITEM: HEATER
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
R. WILSON
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
....... ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS. EXERCISING ACTUATORS OR CHANGING TO A
THERMALLY-WARMATTITUDEMAY NOT BE FEASIBI/E, ....
u
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 12/20/87
ASSESSMENTID: ELEVON-125
NASA FMEA #: 02-6-C01-SW-C06
SUBSYSTEM: ELEVON
MDACID: 125
ITEM: SERVOACTUATOR
LEAD ANALYST: R. WILSON
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CONCUR WITH NASA ANALYSIS. NO ISSUE. THIS IOA FMEA WAS WRITTEN
FOR THE SERVO ACTUATOR. NOTE: IOA FMEA NO. 103 COVERS THE SAME
NASA FMEA BUT FORT HE SWITCHING VALVE.
I
I
I
I
z
I
I
I
I
I
I
REPORT DATE 02/03/88 C-26
I
I
APPENDIX D
CRITICAL ITEMS
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NASA FMEA
02-6-C01-SW-C06
02-6-C01-SW-C02
02-6-C01-A01
02-6-C01-CV-C08
02-6-C01-CV-C09
02-6-C01-FE-B08
02-6-C01-SV-B01
02-6-C01-SV-B02
02-6-C01-PP-A06
02-6-C01-PV-B05
02-6-C01-C06
02-6-C01-PP-A07
02-6-C01-A02
MDAC ID
103
125
104
105
115
106
107
108
109
iii
114
116
117
118
119
ITEM
Switch valve
Switch valve
Servo actuator
Check valve
Check valve
Filter
Servo valve
Servo valve
Secondary Delta P
Power valve
Servo actuator
Transducer-
Piston position
Servo actuator
I
FAILURE MODE
Leakage,
gross external
Fail to transfer
External leakage/
component rupture
downstream of
switch valve
Fail closed
Fail open
Clogged
Fails at null
Fail hardover,
on channel
Loss of output
Jammed
Leaks external-
complete
elastomeric seal
failure
Loss of output
of all four
transducers
Fracture -
tailstock,
rod end etc.
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APPENDIX E
DETAILED ANALYSIS
This appendix contains the IOA analysis worksheets supplementing
previous results reported in STSEOS Working Paper 1.0-SP-VA86001-
07, Analysis of the Elevon Subsystem, (21 November 1986). Prior
results were obtained independently and documented before
starting the FMEA/CIL assessment activity. Supplemental
analysis was performed to address failure modes not previously
considered by the IOA. Each sheet identifies the hardware item
being analyzed, parent assembly and function performed. For each
failure mode possible causes are identified, and hardware and
functional criticality for each mission phase are determined as
described in the NSTS 22206, _ns_n_ctions for Preparation of FMEA
and CIL. _0 October 1986. Failure mode effects are described at
the bottom of each sheet and worst case criticality is identified
at the top. There were no supplemental analysis worksheets
prepared for the Elevon actuator subsystem.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P - Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
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NASA FMEA TO_IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATION
This section provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and
corresponding IOA analysis worksheet(s) included in Appendix E.
The Appendix F identifies: NASA FMEA Number, IOA Assessment
Number, NASA criticality and redundancy screen data, and IOA
recommendations.
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Appendix F Legend
Code Definition
All initial IOA criticality and redundancy screen
differences were agreed to with the NASA subsystem manager.
In addition, the combining of like failures under one FMEA
were agreed to.
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